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British Columbia’s New Family Law on
Guardianship, Relocation, and Family Violence:
The First Year of Judicial Interpretation
Susan B. Boyd and Matt Ledger*
1. INTRODUCTION
British Columbia’s new Family Law Act (FLA) came into force on March 18,
2013, representing the first major overhaul of family law in the province since
1979.1 The goal of the new law is to reflect social change, place children first, and
keep families safe.2 Factors relevant to the best interests of the child principle are
defined, and the language of “custody” and access” is removed in favour of “guard-
ianship”, which normally includes “parental responsibilities” and “parenting time”.
Although the FLA distances itself from presumptions regarding the preferred form
of parenting arrangements, it articulates a default position that on separation, each
parent is the child’s guardian with all parental responsibilities. For the first time in
British Columbia’s family law, family violence is dealt with explicitly, including in
the definition of the best interests of the child. Norms on relocation are also intro-
duced, with burdens of proof that differ depending on the extent to which parenting
was shared. The FLA sets out new norms and procedures for the resolution of fam-
ily disputes, and emphasizes that out-of court dispute resolution should be used
wherever possible.3 The FLA has been hailed as innovative, but concerns have also
been raised about some aspects, including the lack of governmental commitment to
provide the funding and supports necessary for families to successfully negotiate
the new norms.4
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1 Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25 [FLA].
2 British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of the Debates of the Legisla-
tive Assembly, 39th Parl, 4th Sess, No 9 (14 November 2011) at 8845 (Hon S Bond),
online: Debates of the Legislative Assembly (Hansard)
<http://www.leg.bc.ca/hansard/39th4th/index.htm>.
3 FLA, above note 1, s. 4.
4 British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of the Debates of the Legisla-
tive Assembly, 39th Parl, 4th Sess, No 5 (21 November 2011) at 8929 (L Krog) and
8936-7 (C Trevena), online: Debates of the Legislative Assembly (Hansard)
<www.leg.bc.ca/hansard/39th4th/index.htm>. See Rachel Treloar and & S B Boyd,
“Family Law Reform in (Neoliberal) Context: British Columbia’s New Family Law
Act” (2014) 28:1 International J L Pol’y & Fam 77.
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This article reviews the jurisprudence that has emerged over the first year of
the FLA,5 from both the Provincial Court and the Supreme Court of British Colum-
bia in the fields of guardianship, relocation, and family violence. Although it is
early as yet to determine the direction of the jurisprudence, and there is little appel-
late authority, the early case law suggests some trends and indicates some trouble
spots.
2. GUARDIANSHIP
Since the FLA came into force, guardianship has proven to be a key battle-
ground for some separating couples. The FLA specifies that only the best interests
of the children must be considered when making determinations on guardianship
and parenting arrangements.6 Two key provisions that deal with guardianship are
sections 39 and 51. In H. (S.T.) v. G. (R.M.),7 the Provincial Court interpreted sec-
tion 39 as putting parents who have raised children together before separation on a
more equal footing. Judge R. Hamilton stated that “in circumstances where parents
lived together after the birth of their child and then separated, there is no need for
the parents to apply for guardianship because they are statutorily deemed to be the
child’s guardian.”8 This decision attributed significance to the fact that the FLA did
not create a provision for applying for sole guardianship and stated that a presump-
tion of guardianship had been established.9 In Rashtian v. Baraghoush,10 the Su-
preme Court further clarified that “s. 39(1) creates a default position of joint guard-
ianship unless the court orders or the parties agree otherwise.”11
Only guardians are deemed to have parenting responsibilities and parenting
time under the FLA,12 and normally guardianship will arise while a child’s parents
are living together and after they separate.13 Unless an agreement or order allocates
parental responsibilities differently, these responsibilities, which are extensive,14
may be exercised by each guardian in consultation with the other guardians, unless
5 The research is current to June 30, 2014.
6 FLA, above note 1, s. 37(1). See D. (C.W.H.), Re, 2013 BCPC 135, 2013 CarswellBC
1700, [2013] B.C.J. No. 1200 (B.C. Prov. Ct.) at para. 10.
7 2013 BCPC 114, 2013 CarswellBC 1412 (B.C. Prov. Ct.) [H.(S.T.)].
8 Ibid. at para. 95.
9 Ibid. at para. 149. The BC government has stated repeatedly that there is no presump-
tion in favour of equal parenting, but that is different than a presumption that both
parents will have guardianship. See e.g. British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Offi-
cial Report of the Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 39th Parl, 4th Sess, No 5 (21
November 2011) at 8946 (Hon S Bond). For concerns that a presumption of guardian-
ship would be established and problems that might arise as a result, see Susan B Boyd,
“Joint Custody and Guardianship in the British Columbia Courts: Not a Cautious Ap-
proach” (2010) 29:3 Can. Fam. L.Q. 223 [Boyd, “Joint Custody”].
10 2013 BCSC 994, 2013 CarswellBC 1670, [2013] B.C.J. No. 1180 (B.C. S.C.)
[Rashtian].
11 Ibid. at para. 26.
12 FLA, above note 1, s. 40.
13 Ibid., s. 39.
14 Ibid., s. 41.
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consultation would be unreasonable or inappropriate.15 As the Supreme Court has
noted, responsibilities may be shared or exercised separately depending on whether
it would be unreasonable to order shared parenting responsibilities.16 If a person is
removed as guardian, that person’s parenting responsibilities cease, but they may
still obtain “contact” with the child by agreement or order under sections 58 and
59.17 Three recurring issues have arisen concerning guardianship that courts have
tackled at length since the introduction of the FLA. These are appointment of
guardianship, termination of guardianship, and the nature of guardianship rights
where they are awarded.
(a) Appointment of a Guardian
If parties are not statutorily entitled to guardianship under section 40, they can
still apply to a court to be appointed a guardian, based on sections 39(3) or 51(1).
Several cases have involved this scenario.
In P. (D.) v. S. (S.),18 the parties had a six year old child. In addition to the
mother and father, the grandmother was also applying for guardianship because the
home was unstable, she felt that neither parent was capable, and the parents had
had a rocky relationship characterized by drug abuse and violence. The father had
relapsed with alcohol six months prior but had been off drugs for two to three years
by the time of the application. The mother qualified as a guardian under section 39
because she had lived with the child, although during the first three and a half years
following the child’s birth she was in a drug addicted state. The father did not qual-
ify as a guardian because he had never lived with the child. He had taken steps to
go to recovery, and despite the grandmother’s concerns the Ministry had none with
either parent. Given these circumstances, the Provincial Court granted all three par-
ties interim guardianship. The rationale was that “this extended family needs slow,
steady, successful steps in order to foster respect and trust, and understanding of
each other so that [the child’s] life can expand to include a healthy stable relation-
ship with her mother and father and grandmother and uncle and aunt.”19 The Court
was satisfied that both parties had made a commitment to moving forward, despite
the father’s recent relapses and concerns about the child being alone with her
mother.20
The Provincial Court placed weight on the fact that the Ministry had not ex-
pressed concerns about the parents in P.(D.), even where the evidence suggested
there might still be cause for concern. Primacy was given to the importance of
children fostering relationships with their natural parents, and the judge seemed
willing to do more than to grant contact in order to facilitate the nurturing of the
15 Ibid., s. 40(2).
16 See J. (C.A.) v. J. (N.), 2014 BCSC 279, 2014 CarswellBC 443, [2014] B.C.J. No. 305
(B.C. S.C.) at para. 92 [J.(C.A.)], and G. (M.A.) v. M. (P.L.), 2014 BCSC 126, 2014
CarswellBC 216, [2014] B.C.J. No. 134 (B.C. S.C.) at para. 43.
17 Ibid. at para. 92. Contact can be ordered under FLA, above note 1, s. 59, or agreed upon
under s. 58.
18 2013 BCPC 181, 2013 CarswellBC 2192, [2013] B.C.J. No. 1565 (B.C. Prov. Ct.).
19 Ibid. at para. 53.
20 Ibid. at para. s. 57-58.
320   CANADIAN FAMILY LAW QUARTERLY [33 C.F.L.Q.]
relationships. That the parties had recently been abusive to each other, the child did
not want to be alone with the mother, and the father had had recent struggles with
alcohol were not enough to deny them guardianship. This case suggests a relatively
low bar that a birth parent has to surmount in order to be appointed a guardian.
Addiction and unreliable behaviour were not enough to prevent that outcome, as
long as the parents showed willingness to improve their behaviour.
Another important case is F. (T.) v. D. (A.).21 In this case, the mother had
guardianship and the father had contact according to an interim consent order.22
The child had special needs, and the father had a criminal record, an inability to
pick up his child’s cues, and an inability to put the child first. He was combative
with the child’s medical care professionals. The child presented well sometimes
and terribly other times following visits with the father. The Provincial Court held
that when determining guardianship, “the actual history of the child’s care is more
important than the wording of the now historical order.”23 The court also took into
consideration the time spent with the child, and the fact that going to prison had cut
into the father’s time.24 Because the child had special needs, the court considered
the likelihood of each parent listening to care providers in awarding the mother
decision making authority.25 While the father was found to be a guardian pursuant
to section 39(3) because he had regularly cared for the child, his behaviour led the
court to limit his parenting responsibilities to those occurring during his parenting
time, and he could not make any medical, dental or health decisions in respect of
the child. This case shows that the nature of “guardianship” rights is case depen-
dent, and that regular care of the child can be enough to appoint someone a guard-
ian even where it is contrary to a prior order or agreement.
The Supreme Court also addressed this issue in F. (S.J.) v. N. (R.M.).26 Here,
too, the father never lived with the child. The parties had been together briefly
during 2011. They soon separated and following the separation, the mother discov-
ered she was pregnant. The father had seen his child on a weekly basis for only a
few months since its birth in 2012. There was a three week interruption of that
weekly access. The Court found that such limited contact “cannot be characterized
as him having ‘regular care’ of the child” within the meaning of section 39 of the
FLA.27 Therefore, the father had to apply to be appointed a guardian under section
51. The court granted the father guardianship in any event, despite the fact that the
mother had made allegations that the father had been violent towards her sexually,
21 2013 BCPC 205, 2013 CarswellBC 2277, [2013] B.C.J. No. 1695 (B.C. Prov. Ct.)
[F.(T.)].
22 Ibid. at paras. S. 3-4.
23 Ibid. at para. 22.
24 Ibid. at para. 30.
25 Ibid. at para. 29.
26 2013 BCSC 1812, 2013 CarswellBC 2982, [2013] B.C.J. No. 2175 (B.C. S.C.)
[F.(S.J.)].
27 Ibid. at para. 30. Section 39(3) of the FLA, above note 1, suggests that a parent who has
never resided with his or her child might nevertheless become a guardian by regularly
caring for the child. “Regular care” is not defined so the jurisprudence on this point
will be important.
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was controlling and manipulative, and had spat at her. According to the judge, the
sexual assault allegations were not proven on a balance of probabilities but the
other allegations were accepted. The Court noted instead that the father had no
criminal record, that it was in the best interests of the child to have both parents
actively involved in the child’s upbringing, and that his dominant and controlling
personality did not impair his ability to be a good parent.28
These cases suggest that when it comes to appointing parties as guardians, the
courts have thus far set a fairly low bar. They seem to give primacy to the principle
that maximum contact with and care by parents is a good thing for children, even
where those parents have battled addictions or there have been allegations of do-
mestic abuse, so long as that abuse is not directed towards the child. The slightest
hint of efforts at rehabilitation or improvements in behaviour has been enough to
date for the courts to declare people guardians provided they have either lived with
the child, exercised regular care (as in F.(T.)), or the judge simply felt it was impor-
tant for the child to have an active father figure. This approach is consistent with
broader trends to encourage involvement by fathers, sometimes in circumstances
that are less than optimal.29 Yet the FLA does not contain a maximum contact prin-
ciple. To date, it seems that BC judges are presuming, and preferring, that parents
of a child have guardianship, continuing and strengthening the approach that had
emerged under the Family Relations Act.30 To the extent that a parent’s behaviour
and access needs to be controlled or limited, the courts so far seem to favour doing
so by restricting the scope of their parenting responsibilities or decision-making
authority, rather than denying them guardianship.
This approach may perhaps be explained by the fact that guardianship orders
can be varied should the parents change and improve their behaviour. Parents and
other important parties are therefore given more opportunity for growth and to play
significant roles in the lives of children. The risk, though, is that in setting such a
low bar, courts will expose children to negative or debilitating influences and per-
petuate their exposure to family conflict where decision-making authority is not
clear or ill placed. As with other jurisdictions that prioritize contact while also em-
phasizing the significance of domestic violence to children’s wellbeing, contact ap-
pears too often to trump safety.31 What is surprising is that this trend is occurring in
British Columbia despite the strong language emphasizing children’s safety in the
28 F.(S.J.), above note 26 at para. 94.
29 Fiona Kelly, “Enforcing a Parent/Child Relationship at all Cost? Supervised Access
Orders in the Canadian Courts” (2011) 49:2 Osgoode Hall L.J. 277.
30 Family Relations Act, RSBC 1996, c. 128 [FRA]. See Boyd, “Joint Custody” above
note 9, where it was suggested that the shift of default provisions in the FLA towards
ongoing guardianship of parents might exacerbate the trend to award joint guardianship
in circumstances that were less than ideal, such as serious conflict between the parents.
31 See e.g. Helen Rhoades, “Legislating to Promote Children’s Welfare, and the Quest for
Certainty” (2012) 24:2 Child & Fam L.Q. 158 [Rhoades, “Legislating to Promote Chil-
dren’s Welfare”].
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FLA and the absence of a maximum contact principle.32 We return to this issue
below in our discussion of family violence.
(b) Termination of Guardianship
Another main issue that the courts have had to address is the termination of
guardianship. In fact, they have had some difficulty determining the appropriate
avenue for termination of guardianship. Termination cases have been brought under
both sections 39 and 51, and courts have used both sections. In an early case, H.
(S.T.) v. G. (R.M.),33 the Provincial Court stated that “should a parent wish to have
sole guardianship of a child in circumstances where both parents are statutorily
presumptive guardians, then the route to that outcome, in my view, is for one parent
to apply to terminate the other parent’s guardianship pursuant to section 51(1)(b) of
the FLA.”34 The court held that termination could only be granted under this sec-
tion “in the rarest and clearest of cases where cancelling guardianship was clearly
in the child’s best interests.”35 In that case the mother had had difficulty fulfilling
her parenting responsibilities and had exposed her child to violent relationships.
Since she was able to exercise some of these responsibilities at the time of trial, and
was no longer in a violent relationship at that time, terminating the mother’s guard-
ianship was not found to be necessary. The very next day on May 1, 2013, the
Provincial Court held in M. (J.L.) v. T. (G.A.),36 that there was authority to termi-
nate guardianship under section 39, so there was no need to go into section 51
analysis.37
It remains unclear which section the courts will gravitate towards when decid-
ing whether to terminate a party’s guardianship rights. A plain reading of section
51 indicates that it is the section that expressly contemplates the termination of
guardianship. In either case however, it appears that the standards the courts will
use are the same. To this point, courts have been fairly consistent in setting a very
high bar for termination of guardianship status. Only in the clearest of cases will
courts find that cancelling guardianship for a party is in the child’s best interests. In
D. (C.W.H.), Re,38 the Provincial Court reasoned that “termination can only occur
in the most extreme situations. The approach to be taken is, first, to ask whether,
through an allocation of parenting responsibilities, it continues to be in the best
interests of the children that the parent remain a guardian. If it is, guardianship
32 Notably, section 37(3) of the FLA, above note 1, states that an agreement or order is
not in the best interests of a child unless it protects, to the greatest extent possible, the
child’s physical, psychological and emotional safety, security and well-being.
33 S.T.H., above note 7.
34 Ibid. at para. 102.
35 Ibid. at para. 150. The court also mentions at para. 103 that the FLA “does not set out
what the court should consider” in termination cases, other than “the overarching con-
sideration of the child’s best interests set out in s. 37 of the F.L.A.”
36 2013 BCPC 96, 2013 CarswellBC 1102, [2013] B.C.J. No. 886 (B.C. Prov. Ct.).
37 Ibid. at para. 12.
38 2013 BCPC 135, 2013 CarswellBC 1700, [2013] B.C.J. No. 1200 (B.C. Prov. Ct.)
[D.(C.W.H.)].
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should not be terminated.”39 The court places great emphasis on giving parents “the
maximum opportunity to remain a significant part of the child’s life.”40
What constitutes a clear case sufficient for termination is still being defined.
M.(J.L.) featured evidence of repeated family violence on the part of the father, and
a lack of desire on his part to exercise his guardianship rights. In H.(S.T.), the
mother was found to have capacity to exercise some of her parenting responsibili-
ties, and despite a history of involvement in violent relationships, was no longer in
one. In both cases, the court declined to terminate guardianship. In G. (M.A.) v. M.
(P.L.),41 the Supreme Court followed and cited D. (C.W.H.), Re, for the view that
“guardianship should only be terminated in the most extreme situations and only
after determining whether through an allocation of parental responsibilities, it is in
a child’s best interests that the parent(s) remain a guardian.”42 Rather than risk
depriving both the parent and child of a parent-child relationship, the courts have
taken the position that “by allocating or reallocating parenting responsibilities to a
more capable parent as opposed to terminating guardianship, a child may safely
retain the benefit of having a parent remain a significant part of his or her life.”43
Until now, occasional acts of family violence and a history of neglectful beha-
viour have not been enough to terminate guardianship as long as the guardians are
making efforts to improve and remain involved in the child’s life. Repeated inci-
dents of violence towards members of the family are not necessarily enough to strip
parties of their guardianship rights.44 Particularly where the child expresses a wish
to remain connected to a guardian, courts will presume that it is in the child’s best
interests to have both parents as heavily involved in their lives as possible. If the
Ministry either expresses confidence in the parents or continues to play a role in the
family, keeping parents involved in children’s lives appears more likely. This ap-
proach could potentially leave children vulnerable to abuse where their expressed
desire to remain close to a guardian is motivated by fear, as is often the case in
abusive relationships where one party is disempowered. Children’s reliance on
guardians makes them extremely vulnerable in such circumstances.
However, a recent decision by the Court of Appeal indicates that going for-
ward, there may be unique circumstances where guardians could be stripped of that
status and some of their parenting responsibilities. In British Columbia Birth
Registration No. 2004-59-020158, Re,45 the mother and father had separated when
their only child was eighteen months old. After separation, they reached a separa-
tion agreement that gave the mother sole custody and the father reasonable ac-
cess.46 They finalized a divorce four years later and the mother re-married. The
39 Ibid. at para. 24.
40 Ibid. at para. 26.
41 2014 BCSC 126, 2014 CarswellBC 216, [2014] B.C.J. No. 134 (B.C. S.C.).
42 Ibid. at para. 44.
43 Ibid.
44 D.(C.W.H.), above note 38 at para. 27.
45 2014 BCCA 137, 2014 CarswellBC 926, [2014] B.C.J. No. 623 (B.C. C.A.); additional
reasons 2014 CarswellBC 2650 (B.C. C.A.) [British Columbia Birth Registration
(BCCA)].
46 Ibid. at para. 1.
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mother applied to BC Supreme Court for an order that the child be adopted by her
new husband, and that the requirement of the father’s consent be waived. The trial
judge declined to dispense with the father’s right to consent, and did not resolve the
issue of his guardianship rights. The mother appealed, asking for a determination
on the father’s guardianship rights and for the court to remove the requirement that
the father consent to the adoption.
This case had particularly interesting facts. Following their separation in 2006,
the father was hospitalized and treated for major depression and substance depen-
dency. For the following two years he struggled with substance problems, which
led to dangerous behaviour where he repeatedly endangered himself, even attempt-
ing suicide on one occasion. From about 2008 onwards, his access to the child
became sporadic and eventually “ceased altogether.”47 During the trial, the judge
noted that “as the mother became more committed to [her new husband], she be-
came less committed to ensuring that the child saw his father. She testified that the
child was looking to identify with a male role model and that [her new husband]
became the child’s male role model as they spent more time together.”48 This
bonding resulted in the child developing closer ties to the mother’s new husband.
The trial judge noted that “there [was] no dispute the child considers [his mother’s
new husband] to be his father.” Late in the summer of 2010, the mother and her
husband moved to interior British Columbia without notifying the father. Over the
next two years the father cleaned up and obtained gainful employment. He made a
series of attempts to gain access to his son, which the mother frustrated.49
In determining whether the father still qualified as a guardian, the Court of
Appeal first considered the original separation agreement under the old Family Re-
lations Act,50 which granted the mother custody and the father reasonable access. It
referred to a transition provision of the FLA, section 251(1)(b), under which a party
with access to, but not custody or guardianship of, a child has only contact with the
child, not guardianship. The Court nevertheless held that the separation agreement
did not remove the father’s guardianship rights because it referred very generally to
guardianship “without more” and implicitly continued the guardianship regime in
place, which afforded joint guardianship of the child’s estate to both parties.51 It
stated that section 251, as a transitional provision, should not be lightly interpreted
as taking away substantive vested rights.52
47 Ibid. at para. 9, quoting British Columbia Birth Registration No. 2004-59-020158, Re,
2013 BCSC 1262, [2013] B.C.J. No. 1540 (B.C. S.C.) at para. 19 ; reversed in part
2014 CarswellBC 926 (B.C. C.A.); additional reasons 2014 CarswellBC 2650 (B.C.
C.A.) [British Columbia Birth Registration (BCSC)].
48 Ibid. at para. 10, quoting British Columbia Birth Registration (BCSC), above note 47 at
para. 22.
49 Ibid. at para. 24.
50 FRA, above note 30. The concept of guardianship was different under the old statute
and referred mainly to decision-making. In the FLA, it embraces both parental respon-
sibilities and parenting time.
51 British Columbia Birth Registration (BCCA), above note 45 at para. 59.
52 Ibid. at para. 58.
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However, the Court of Appeal found that it would not be in the child’s best
interests for the father to have the particular decision-making rights contemplated
in s. 41(h, i, j, and k) of the FLA and terminated his guardianship rights. The Court
cited the mother’s re-marriage, the trial judge’s appointment of her new husband as
a guardian of the child, and the potential for friction and impasses53 as the primary
justification. That said, it ordered that the father be notified from time to time of
decisions made in respect of the child, and that the mother and her husband facili-
tate telephone and e-mail contact between father and child on a “reasonably regular
basis.”54 The case seems to indicate that where a prior separation agreement grants
a mother custody, the father has been absent from the child for a long period of
time due to mental health issues, the child has bonded with another father figure,
and it would create additional conflict to grant the father parental responsibilities,
courts may be willing to terminate a biological father’s guardianship status.
(c) The Nature of Guardianship
Where the courts have established guardianship rights, their structuring of
parenting arrangements has been instructive, especially regarding what level of
sharing of parental responsibilities and parenting time is deemed appropriate. Sec-
tion 40(4) of the FLA emphasizes that no particular parenting arrangement is pre-
sumed to be in a child’s best interests. In particular, it must not be presumed that
parental responsibilities should be allocated equally among guardians, that parent-
ing time should be shared equally, or that decisions should be made separately or
together.55
In D. (L.D.) v. C. (R.C.),56 one of the first guardianship cases under the FLA,
the Supreme Court found that “[e]ach of the parties have fulfilled some of the roles
normally reserved for parents albeit often in conflict with one another”.57 There-
fore, the Court held that both parties would be guardians and would consult each
other “as contemplated by the former ‘Master Joyce Model’ and as now provided in
the Family Law Act, ss. 39–45”.58 The Master Joyce model had been used in some
guardianship cases under the old statute, particularly where there were concerns
about the parents’ ability to cooperate.59 Under the Joyce model, even if parents
shared joint guardianship and had the obligation to discuss decisions of a signifi-
cant nature, such as health or education, one parent was given final decision-mak-
ing power in the case of failure to reach agreement despite best efforts. In D.
(L.D.), the court gave final decision-making to the father, and gave the mother the
right to apply to court to challenge any decision. It was not clear on the reasons
why the father was awarded final decision-making over the mother. Nevertheless,
this case signalled that the Joyce model could be adapted for use under the FLA.
53 Ibid. at para. 61.
54 Ibid.
55 FLA, above note 1, s. 40(4).
56 2013 BCSC 590, 2013 CarswellBC 866, [2013] B.C.J. No. 662 (B.C. S.C.).
57 Ibid. at para. 22.
58 Ibid. at para. 25.
59 See Boyd, “Joint Custody”, above note 9, for further elaboration of the Joyce Model.
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About a month later, P. (G.) v. P. (M.J.R.)60 was decided by Justice Crawford
of the Supreme Court. In this case, an existing interim order under the old statute
had granted joint guardianship on the Joyce Model, giving the father principal resi-
dence and decision-making authority. The basis for this order was the “mother’s
basic inability to be punctual, her lifestyle, her inability to be truthful and her belli-
cose attitude towards anyone questioning her abilities.”61 Although the father had
primary parenting responsibilities, the mother had actually spent more days with
the children over the preceding year. The court upheld the interim order, giving
decision-making authority to the party with primary residence, rather than the one
who had spent more time with the child. Justice Crawford felt that the children
were flourishing under the father’s decision-making, and highlighted the need for
stability.
This case was significant because, despite the fact that section 37(2)(d) of the
FLA emphasizes “the history of the child’s care” as a factor that must be considered
in determining the best interests of a child, the court did not find the past record of
parenting time to be determinative of a parent receiving primary residence or deci-
sion-making authority. In this case, preserving stability was seen as more impor-
tant, since the children were on a successful track. By and large, judges seem to be
applying the Joyce Model, with case by case variations on who gets ultimate deci-
sion making authority that are based on factors such as stability for the child, which
parent is more willing to facilitate contact, and which parent is more likely to listen
to specialists and professionals.62
The courts also seem to be in favour of giving more parenting time to the party
to whom it grants primary decision-making authority. The BC Supreme Court dis-
cussed this topic further in M. (B.D.) v. M. (A.E.),63 where the father sought sole
custody of the child with limited supervised access to the mother. The mother
sought an order giving her the bulk of parenting time and final authority over many
areas of parental responsibility.64 The Court gave the bulk of the parenting time
and final authority to the mother, based on the father’s “lack of insight about his
own shortcomings and in particular to his demonstrated inability to distinguish be-
tween his perceptions and objective reality, and make decisions that are in [the
child’s] best interests.”65 The court also opined that the child’s best interests “will
be promoted by an arrangement in which she spends the majority of her time living
with the party who will have the final authority to make important decisions about
her upbringing.”66
60 2013 BCSC 746, 2013 CarswellBC 1092, [2013] B.C.J. No. 867 (B.C. S.C.).
61 Ibid. at para. 8.
62 See also Van Kooten v. More, 2013 BCSC 1076, 2013 CarswellBC 1829, [2013] B.C.J.
No. 1305 (B.C. S.C.); F.(T.), above note 21; M. (C.K.B.) v. M. (G.), 2013 BCSC 836,
2013 CarswellBC 1290, [2013] B.C.J. No. 982 (B.C. S.C.).
63 2014 BCSC 453, 2014 CarswellBC 706, [2014] B.C.J. No. 474 (B.C. S.C.) [M.(B.D.)].
64 Ibid. at para. 89.
65 Ibid. at para. 161.
66 Ibid. at para. 168.
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Another interesting theme that has emerged is what is required of guardians in
the exercise of their parenting responsibilities. In P. (L.J.) v. B. (D.L.),67 the Pro-
vincial Court stated that “s. 40 [of the FLA] obligates each guardian to exercise
parental responsibilities with respect to the child in consultation with the child’s
other guardians unless that consultation would be unreasonable or inappropriate in
the circumstances. This section demands that parents communicate effectively.”68
In this statement the court seems to interpret section 40 of the FLA as requiring
civil communication between guardians.
In M.(B.D.), the BC Supreme Court characterized the case as a “prolonged and
ruinously expensive dispute between the parties.”69 Justice Sewell observed that
“the parties have a very limited ability to cooperate on issues affecting [their child].
That lack of cooperation has already adversely affected timely arrangements for
[the child’s] education, and her ability to engage in other activities. It is clear to me
that the best interests of [the child] require that any parenting arrangement ordered
cannot be dependent upon cooperation between the parents.”70 Yet despite making
these statements, the court still required that the mother “attempt to consult” with
the father prior to exercising her parenting responsibilities.
While courts have stated several times that they want to limit conflict between
the parents, practically speaking, it seems that requiring one parent to consult the
other prior to making decisions can risk increasing conflict. It is unclear at the mo-
ment what the bar is that would make such communication inappropriate or unrea-
sonable. It appears that courts will have a low tolerance for guardians who are un-
willing to communicate with each other. It will be particularly interesting to see
how courts enforce this requirement in cases involving allegations of abuse or un-
balanced power dynamics. Presumably, they will be more likely to regard cases
involving family violence or abuse as presenting circumstances where demanding
communication between the parties is unreasonable.71
One way in which judges have begun to address difficulties in communication
is by requiring guardians to consult with parenting coordinators in the event of
disagreement on major decisions. An innovation of the FLA is the delineation of
the responsibilities and powers of parenting coordinators.72 In Rashtian, the parents
showed an unwillingness to coordinate their decision-making in respect of the
child.73 As there was no evidence of an abusive dynamic, the court felt it was pos-
67 2013 BCPC 104, 2013 CarswellBC 1180, [2013] B.C.J. No. 946 (B.C. Prov. Ct.)
[P.(L.J.)].
68 Ibid. at para. 6.
69 M.(B.D.), above note 63 at para. 1.
70 Ibid. at para. 170.
71 Indeed, in M. (L.J.S.) v. S. (L.T.), 2013 BCSC 796, 2013 CarswellBC 1177, [2013]
B.C.J. No. 941 (B.C. S.C.) [M.(L.J.S.)], where one party was seen as abusively manipu-
lating the other, the parent being manipulated was given sole custody (this was mainly
a Divorce Act RSC 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp) [DA] case, so the language of custody was
used) and not required to communicate with the other party for the purpose of decision-
making.
72 FLA, above note 1, ss. 14–19.
73 Rashtian, above note 10.
328   CANADIAN FAMILY LAW QUARTERLY [33 C.F.L.Q.]
sible for, and incumbent on, the parents to overcome their inability to communicate
for the sake of their children. To that end, the parents were required to retain a
parenting coordinator in the event of an impasse and ordered to share the costs of
the parenting coordinator equally.74
Parenting coordination can offer positive implications for children. In appro-
priate cases, it has the potential to transform the communication patterns of parents
and enable them to be more united in parenting even as they are separating. It may
assist in reducing the potential for conflict over decision-making that may be detri-
mental to children, and prevent children from being used as a weapon or as a con-
duit for undermining the other party. If successful, children may have the opportu-
nity to develop positive relationships with each parent. Questions remain, however,
about who bears the costs and whether parenting coordinators can be used effec-
tively in cases reflecting a pattern of abuse or other very serious power imbalances.
Some parents may be unable to bear the costs of a parenting coordinator. It is con-
ceivable that a parenting coordinator might be assigned in circumstances that might
have warranted an order restricting the role of one parent. In order for all parents
and children to benefit from innovations such as parenting coordinators, it is in-
cumbent upon the government to consider funding or subsidies for parties who can-
not afford this assistance themselves and to monitor whether this innovation is be-
ing used only in appropriate circumstances.
3. CHANGE OF RESIDENCE AND RELOCATION
Difficulties can arise when one parent proposes to change either the location
of their residence or that of the child. In fact, this issue is one of the most frequently
litigated in family law.75 One novel aspect of the FLA is that it establishes guide-
lines and burdens of proof (some would say presumptions) to assist with decision-
making in this controversial field. In J. (L.L.) v. J. (E.),76 the court noted that when
a relocation application is decided, 
[a]lmost inevitably, someone’s heart is broken no matter what the outcome
of the application. If the party seeking to relocate is denied permission,
plans are shelved, opportunities are lost and the overall welfare of the fam-
ily, beyond considerations strictly concerned with the best interests of the
child, are compromised. If the application is allowed, the party left behind
struggles to maintain a relationship with the child often at considerable dis-
tance and expense, frequently in circumstances of modest means.77
Apart from cases of abuse where the relocation is done for the sake of child or
spousal safety, a relocation scenario can mean that someone inevitably loses out.
To what extent the FLA guidelines will assist in these difficult decisions is thus a
question of great interest. Before the burdens of proof in Division 6 (section 69)
kick in, it must be determined which of sections 46 or 69 applies.
74 Ibid. at para. 54.
75 Rollie Thompson, “Where is B.C. Law Going? The New Mobility” (2012) 30:3 Can.
Fam. L.Q. 235 at 238 [Thompson, “New Mobility”].
76 2013 BCSC 1233, 2013 CarswellBC 2101, [2013] B.C.J. No. 1506 (B.C. S.C.).
77 Ibid. at para. 18.
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(a) Change of Residence or Relocation? Whether to Apply Section 46 or
Section 69
The first step is determining whether any prior orders or agreements between
the parties govern the parenting arrangement. Where none exists, section 46 on
changes to the location of the child’s residence applies. Where, on the other hand,
there is a prior order or agreement, Division 6 applies, specifically sections 64–70.
Deciding which sections of the Act apply sounds fairly straightforward. However,
judges have already identified a grey area that is complicating decisions. Intense
debate has arisen regarding whether interim orders or agreements constitute prior
orders or agreements for the purposes of triggering Division 6.
In R. (L.J.) v. R. (S.W.),78 several interim orders regarding division of parent-
ing time between the parties were in effect prior to the application. The key consid-
eration undertaken by the Supreme Court was whether these prior orders consti-
tuted “an order respecting parenting arrangements or contact with a child”, as
contemplated by the Act. The FLA itself does not distinguish between final orders
and interim orders for this purpose. In this case, the court noted that there was “no
indication that the form of an agreement or order should be considered by a court
faced with these circumstances”.79 Therefore, “the analysis of a given order or
agreement must be restricted to the subject matter of that order or agreement —
nothing more nothing less.”80 Applying this criterion, as the interim orders ad-
dressed arrangements around contact with the child, they were sufficient to trigger
Division 6 and the relocation analysis was conducted under section 69.81
The decision in R.(L.J.) was subsequently questioned by the Supreme Court in
S. (S.L.) v. S. (J.A.)82 and F. (S.J.) v. N. (R.M.).83 In both cases, the courts high-
lighted the importance of exercising caution concerning interim orders and were
critical of the suggestion that interim orders sufficiently qualified as orders for the
purposes of triggering section 69 of the FLA. They noted that interim orders do not
qualify as orders because by definition, courts have not heard all the evidence or
had the benefit of submissions from counsel.84 As well, trial judges are in a better
position than chambers judges to have all the facts.85 Because prior parenting ar-
rangements are used in section 69 to establish presumptions in favour of one party
or the other, a legitimate concern arises that interim orders could be used to do so in
cases where all the facts have not yet been fully vetted.
78 2013 BCSC 1344, 2013 CarswellBC 2283, [2013] B.C.J. No. 1645 (B.C. S.C.)
[R.(L.J.)].
79 Ibid. at para. 52.
80 Ibid. at para. 53.
81 Ibid. at para. 56.
82 2013 BCSC 1775, 2013 CarswellBC 2913, [2013] B.C.J. No. 2134 (B.C. S.C.)
[S.(S.L.)].
83 F.(S.J.), above note 26.
84 Ibid. at para. 51.
85 S.L.S., above note 82 at para. 31.
330   CANADIAN FAMILY LAW QUARTERLY [33 C.F.L.Q.]
This debate has yet to be settled. On October 31, 2013, the BC Supreme Court
attempted to provide resolution in D. (A.J.) v. E. (E.A.).86 In this case, the parties
had an interim consent order that had been issued at the judicial case conference.
The court considered both perspectives, acknowledging the concern that an interim
order that may not have had the benefit of fulsome consideration of evidence by a
judge could be used to impose a presumption one way or another pursuant to sec-
tion 69(4).87 However, the court noted that “the principles of statutory interpreta-
tion would not ordinarily support limiting the interpretation of orders to exclude
interim orders. . . . The FLA does not distinguish between written agreements
which are interim and those which establish more permanent parenting arrange-
ments, and indeed it would be difficult to make this distinction.”88 The court fur-
ther noted that the parties “could have elected not to confirm the agreement they
reached at the judicial case conference in the form of a consent order.”89 On this
reasoning, the interim consent order was deemed to be an order for the purposes of
triggering Division 6 analysis.90
Most recently, in N. (S.) v. C. (E.),91 the mother proposed moving the children
from Tofino to Penticton. Two interim orders dealt with guardianship of the chil-
dren and the father’s access. One interim order came into effect a year and a half
prior to this hearing, the other approximately six months before. Citing R.(L.J.), the
Provincial Court held that they were orders respecting parenting arrangements as
contemplated by s. 65 and that Division 6 therefore applied to the relocation.92
When it comes to determining whether relocation should be granted on an
interim application, however, Master Scarth of the Supreme Court has since noted
in K. (D.R.) v. G. (S.G.)93 that relocation cases should not be decided in this man-
ner. The Master stated that “[a]n interim order allowing [the claimant] to move
would have the effect of a final order and interim proceedings are not geared for
final determination of issues”.94 The application was adjourned to trial. The con-
cern about applying the Division 6 analysis, which uses presumptions based on
certain facts, especially applies to interim applications where, as in K.(D.R.), there
is conflicting affidavit evidence concerning the best interests of the child.
(b) Section 46: Change of Location of Residence
As outlined above, section 46 specifically governs changes to the location of a
child’s residence. It is triggered when all of the following apply: There is no prior
agreement or order as discussed above, a guardian makes an application under sec-
86 2013 BCSC 2160, 2013 CarswellBC 3581, [2013] B.C.J. No. 2586 (B.C. S.C.) [D.
(A.J.)].
87 Ibid. at paras. 29-30.
88 Ibid. at para. 31.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid. at para. 32.
91 2014 BCPC 82, 2014 CarswellBC 1276, [2014] B.C.J. No. 898 (B.C. Prov. Ct.).
92 Ibid. at para. 92.
93 2013 BCSC 2107, 2013 CarswellBC 3524, [2013] B.C.J. No. 2531 (B.C. S.C.).
94 Ibid. at para. 17.
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tion 45 for an order concerning parenting arrangements, the child’s guardian plans
to change the location of the child’s residence, and that change can reasonably be
expected to have a significant impact on that child’s relationship with another
guardian or other significant persons in the child’s life.95 Section 46(2) outlines
what factors the Court should consider when determining the parenting arrange-
ments that would be in the best interests of the child, in addition to the factors set
out in section 37(2).
Section 46 has not, as yet, received much judicial examination. In K. (T.) v. A.
(R.J.H.),96 the Supreme Court noted that “section 46(2) of the FLA expressly man-
dates that the court must consider the reasons for the proposed change in location
of the child’s residence, but must not consider whether the parent who is planning
to move would do so without the child.”97 This wording differs slightly from sec-
tion 69(7), which stipulates that “the court must not consider whether a guardian
would still relocate if the child’s relocation were not permitted.” The BC Supreme
Court has since interpreted section 69(7) as providing “that a trial judge must not
consider a statement by the relocating parent that he or she would not move without
the child as opposed to whether or not he or she would move without the child.”98
In K.(T.), the court also noted that “[t]he FLA is strangely silent on the converse
question of whether the evidence of the other parent may be considered.”99 These
statements suggest that courts may choose to allow different evidence depending on
whether a relocation issue is decided under section 46 or section 69. In K.(T.),
rather than delving further into a s. 46 analysis, the court declined to decide the
case under the FLA, choosing instead to apply the Divorce Act jurisprudence on
relocation and indicating that the factors to be weighed differ from those in the
FLA.100
A detailed discussion of the application of section 46 also occurred in De Jong
v. Gardner,101 which involved an application for primary residence. The father was
from Alberta and the mother from BC, and they had a seven year old son. When the
child was five, the mother unilaterally relocated to Alberta with the child, and told
the father she was staying there. She gave the father regular access and he had since
made several visits to see the child. Both parties were capable parents and had been
involved in caring for the child. The child had a good relationship with each and
the Court decided that he had been removed from a stable life in BC. The court
went through the section 46 factors as discussed above, but found that while the
first two requirements of section 46 were met, section 46 did not apply because the
95 FLA, above note 1, s. 46.
96 2013 BCSC 2112, 2013 CarswellBC 3545, [2013] B.C.J. No. 2540 (B.C. S.C.) [K.(T.)].
97 Ibid. at para. 39.
98 B. (C.M.) v. G. (B.D.), 2014 BCSC 780, 2014 CarswellBC 1232, [2014] B.C.J. No. 871
(B.C. S.C.) at para. 108 [B.(C.M.)].
99 K.(T.), above note 96 at para. 39 [emphasis added].
100 Ibid. In cases where there are claims under both the FLA, above note 1, and the DA,
above note 71, the analysis of the FLA is often unclear. In other cases that we have not
cited, it is not even clear which statute is being applied.
101 2013 BCSC 1303, 2013 CarswellBC 2217, [2013] B.C.J. No. 1597 (B.C. S.C.) [De
Jong].
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mother had already moved with the child, and was not “planning to move”. The
judge chose instead to conduct the analysis under the Divorce Act and ordered that
the child be returned to BC under a shared parenting arrangement. The child was to
have his primary residence with the father until such time as the mother returned. In
another case, R.(L.J.), the court also noted that under section 46, in contrast to sec-
tion 69, the only consideration in determining whether the relocation should be al-
lowed is the child’s best interests.102
(c) Section 69 and Division 6: Relocation and Burdens of Proof
In contrast to section 46, Division 6 establishes burdens of proof, some would
say presumptions, to guide decision-making. Division 6 is triggered when a guard-
ian plans to change the location of the residence of a child or the guardian or both,
and when a written agreement or an order respecting parenting arrangements or
contact applies to the child.103 For the purposes of Division 6, “relocation” means a
change in the location of the residence of a child or guardian that can reasonably be
expected to have a significant impact on the child’s relationship with a guardian or
other persons that have a significant role in the child’s life.104 To qualify as a relo-
cation, according to Master MacNaughton in a pre-trial application in Berry v.
Berry,105 a case must involve a change in residence that would have a significant
impact on the ability of a parent to spend time with their children.106 The test is
child centred, with the impact of a change in residence on a child’s important rela-
tionships being the primary consideration. In Berry, the Supreme Court decided
that a move from Surrey (outside Vancouver) to the North Shore of Vancouver did
not constitute a relocation under the FLA. While the children would have to travel a
little further to see their father and extended family, the move would not meaning-
fully affect the father’s parenting time.
(i) Standing in Relocation Applications
An important issue in relocation cases to date is who has standing to challenge
relocation, and what courts will do in the event that relocation affects those without
standing, for example with parents who are not legal guardians. Specifically, under
the FLA, standing to challenge or apply for relocation is reserved for guardians.107
The decision to move a child falls under the umbrella of parenting responsibilities,
which are held only by guardians.108 In C. (T.) v. C. (S.),109 the court states that
“the father in the case at bar is not a guardian of the child because he never ob-
102 R.(L.J.), above note 78 at para. 61.
103 FLA, above note 1, s. 65(2).
104 Ibid., s. 65(1); G. (S.) v. P. (J.), 2013 BCPC 126, 2013 CarswellBC 1559, [2013] B.C.J.
No. 1105 (B.C. Prov. Ct.) [G.(S.)].
105 2013 BCSC 1095, 2013 CarswellBC 1878, [2013] B.C.J. No. 1334 (B.C. S.C.) [Berry].
106 Ibid. at paras. 26, 28, 33, 37.
107 FLA, above note 1, s. 69(2); C. (T.) v. C. (S.), 2013 BCPC 217, 2013 CarswellBC 2484,
[2013] B.C.J. No. 1815 (B.C. Prov. Ct.) at paras. 35-36 [C.(T.)].
108 FLA, above note 1, s. 40(1), s. 41.
109 C.(T.), above note 107.
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tained an order for custody or guardianship under the Family Relations Act and his
agreement with the mother provides only access to the child.”110 Section 39(3) of
the FLA enables the Court to find guardianship status where, even though the par-
ent has never lived with the child, the party “regularly cares for the child” (among
other avenues). In this case, however, after having resided with the child for a few
months after birth, the father had given up the right to be considered a guardian in a
prior separation agreement.111 As such, the circumstances of this contact parent did
not technically fall within section 39(3).
The Provincial Court nevertheless found that for the purposes of this applica-
tion for relocation, the father could be appointed a guardian under section 51.112
The court noted that the substance of his parenting since signing that agreement
was regular and meaningful. As such, it would be unjust not to award him guardi-
anship for the purposes of determining a relocation application. Despite being
granted standing, the father’s application ultimately failed. The case appears to
stand for the principle that a parent who plays a significant parenting role in the life
of a child, regardless of whether she or he has signed away their right to guardian-
ship via previous agreement, may be appointed as interim guardian in order to chal-
lenge a relocation application.
(ii) Burdens of Proof
Section 66 requires the relocating party to give the other party written notice
of a planned relocation, regardless of whether the relocating guardian is taking the
child. This section reflects the fact that although most relocation cases reflect appli-
cations by a parent to relocate with a child, a move by a guardian away from a child
can create the same disruption in the parent-child relationship. While the notice
requirement might leave abused parties vulnerable to being tracked or harassed by
the other party, thus far, this requirement has been considered inconsequential as
long as it does not prejudice the other party.113
The factors outlined in section 69, especially in sections 69(4) and 69(5), drive
the analysis of relocation cases. Under both subsections, relocating guardians must
show that the relocation is made in good faith, that workable arrangements have
been made to preserve existing relationships with significant persons in the child’s
life, and that the relocation is in the best interests of the children.114 Section 70(2)
also provides that “when making a relocation order, courts must seek to preserve, to
a reasonable extent, parenting arrangements under the original agreement or
order.”115
As the courts have held, sections 69(4) and (5) allocate burdens of proof be-
tween the parties, depending upon whether the guardians have substantially equal
110 Ibid. at para. 50 [emphasis in the original].
111 Ibid. at paras. 15-16.
112 Ibid. at para. 57.
113 G.(S.), above note 104 at para. 35.
114 Hansen v. Mantei-Hansen, 2013 BCSC 876, 2013 CarswellBC 1463, [2013] B.C.J. No.
1038 (B.C. S.C.) at para. 72 ; additional reasons 2013 CarswellBC 3049 (B.C. S.C.)
[Hansen].
115 Ibid. at para. 73.
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parenting time or not.116 When they do have substantially equal parenting time,
section 69(5) applies, placing a heavier burden on the parent who seeks to relocate.
In B. (C.M.) v. G. (B.D.),117 the BC Supreme Court cited Hansard, in which it was
noted that in such cases “the threshold is higher, and the moving guardian has full
responsibility for satisfying the court that the move is made in good faith, that it’s
reasonable and continues to allow workable arrangements.”118
Where they do not have substantially equal parenting time, section 69(4) ap-
plies, so that “the proposed relocation must be presumed to be in the child’s best
interests” once the good faith and reasonable arrangements factors have been met,
placing the burden is on the guardian staying behind to show that it is not in the
child’s best interests.119 However, in B.(C.M.), on appeal from the Provincial
Court, the Supreme Court stated that in its view, “satisfaction of the additional cri-
teria of good faith and reasonable and workable arrangements is a precondition to a
relocating guardian benefiting from a presumption that the move is in the child’s
best interests.”120 The absence of either of these criteria, however, is not determi-
native. They are simply necessary for a guardian to benefit from the 69(4)(b) pre-
sumption and “[i]f one or both of these criteria are not met, the court must still go
on to consider whether the proposed relocation is in the child’s best interests.”121
The ruling in D. (A.J.) v. E. (E.A.)122 demonstrates the reluctance of the courts
to apply these onuses when the prior parenting arrangement comes in the form of a
short term (three month) consent order that was arrived at without full exploration
of the facts.123 This case represents an application of the interim order rule ex-
plained above and suggests that the courts are still debating whether interim orders
are sufficient to trigger presumptions based upon parenting time. Here the court
seemed concerned that three months is too short a time to trigger an onus one way
or another, but whether the courts will take a similar view of interim orders that
have been in effect for longer time periods remains to be seen. In addition, in this
case, the court was unclear which statute was being applied.
In addition, section 69(7) clarifies that judges are not permitted to consider
whether the guardian would still move without the child if the relocation were de-
nied. In M. (M.) v. J. (C.),124 Justice Jenkins clarified that “section 69(7) is meant
to codify the Court of Appeal cases that say I must not consider a statement by the
116 These burdens of proof reflect assumptions about what lies in a child’s best interests
and attempt to provide some certainty in a field that has been largely subject to judicial
discretion. See Susan B Boyd, “Relocation, Indeterminacy, and Burden of Proof: Les-
sons from Canada” (2011) 23:2 Child. & Fam. L.Q. 155.
117 B.(C.M.), above note 98.
118 Ibid. at para. 76.
119 See R.(L.J.), above note 78 at para. 65.
120 B.(C.M.), above note 98 at para. 75.
121 Ibid. at para. 78.
122 D.(A.J.), above note 86.
123 Ibid. at para. 79. There was only a short consent order covering a 3-month span, not
enough to create a presumption one way or the other.
124 2014 BCSC 6, 2014 CarswellBC 10, [2014] B.C.J. No. 8 (B.C. S.C.) [M.(M.)].
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relocating parent that he would not move without the child.”125 In B.(C.M.), the BC
Supreme Court noted on appeal from the Provincial Court that this subsection was
not meant to “limit the court from engaging in a ‘full and sensitive inquiry’ into the
best interests of a child”.126 The possibility of maintaining the status quo was thus
considered as a possible option in this case. Justice Fleming agreed with the inter-
pretation of s. 69(7) which provides that a “trial judge must not consider a state-
ment by a relocating parent that he or she would not move without the child, as
opposed to whether or not he or she would move without the child.”127 All section
69 factors are to be considered under the umbrella of what is in the best interests of
the child under section 37.128
As a result of the different burdens of proof in relocation cases, it is crucial to
analyze what constitutes “substantially equal” versus “non-equal” parenting time.
In C.(T.), in the first two years post separation, the father had contact but not over-
night parenting of the child. Subsequent to that time, the father had the child for
two nights each week and two full parenting days every second week. The court
found that this pattern did not constitute equal parenting time, so section 69(4) was
applied. The mother’s plans were found to have been made in good faith with no
improper motives. She had made reasonable arrangements for contact, which
amounted to an extra 60 minutes of travel, so that no significant impediment in
time or distance was posed to the father preserving his relationship with his son.
The onus was shifted to the father, who opposed the move, to prove that it was not
in the child’s best interests.129 The relocation by the mother and child to Washing-
ton State was permitted.
In D.(A.J.), both parents were involved in the care of the child prior to and
following separation. After the parties separated they agreed to share parenting.
The father had an irregular out of town schedule that made it more difficult to
schedule parenting time. Prior to kindergarten, the court found that the father had a
significant role in the child’s life. The child was now eight, and since kindergarten
the father conceded his parenting time was approximately 30 percent. The Court
found that in this circumstance the mother had substantially more parenting time
and therefore section 69(4) was applied.130
However, the court declined to apply the presumption in favour of the mother.
Instead, it followed the principle outlined in Hadjioannou,131 and regarded the sec-
tion 69 factors as merely factors to be considered under the umbrella of what is in
the best interests of the children, in addition to the section 37 analysis. The court
noted that they merely weigh in one direction or the other, none of them precluding
a best interests analysis.132 Here, the mother was applying for a temporary reloca-
125 Ibid. at para. 47 [emphasis in the original].
126 B.(C.M.), above note 98 at para. 104.
127 Ibid. at para. 108.
128 See Hadjioannou v. Hadjioannou, 2013 BCSC 1682, 2013 CarswellBC 2736, [2013]
B.C.J. No. 2006 (B.C. S.C.) [Hadjioannou]; D.(A.J.), above note 86 at paras. 36-37.
129 C.(T.), above note 107 at para. 65.
130 D.(A.J.), above note 86 at para. 33.
131 Hadjioannou, above note 128.
132 D.(A.J.), above note 86 at paras. 36-37.
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tion to New Brunswick, but there was evidence that the relocation was really in-
tended to “create a new life with her partner”.133 Because the court had not had the
benefit of a trial to fully vet the family dynamics, and since the consent order on
file giving the mother primary parenting time and responsibilities only covered a
recent three month period, there was no legal presumption in favour of the mother’s
relocation.134 The court found it in the best interests of the children to remain in
North Vancouver close to their father and grandparents, with whom they had a
strong bond. The court also noted it would be disruptive to eight year old children
to have to go to a new school in a new part of the country and make friends.135
In B.(C.M.), the BC Supreme Court cited two other cases of relevance when
discussing what comprises substantially equal parenting time. It highlighted A.
(M.K.) v. W. (A.F.),136 where 29 percent of the parenting time, which amounted to
36 per cent when vacation time was included, did not constitute substantially equal
parenting time.137 It also considered the comments of Justice Barrow in M. (H.D.)
v. T. (S.W.),138 who held that “substantially equal” is something different that pre-
cisely equal parenting time, and ruled that five days out of fourteen spent with the
child was substantially equal. The Supreme Court observed that Justice Barrow had
“reached that conclusion with reference not only to the schedule, but also bearing
in mind a term of the parties’ separation agreement providing for shared parenting
with the goal of 50:50 parenting time, and the history of equal parenting time from
2008 until February 2013, approximately 10 months before trial.”139
The FLA provides little guidance on this point and case law suggests that de-
termining substantially equal parenting time will involve more than strict calcula-
tions of time spent with the child.140 These cases seem to indicate that it will take
significant and sustained differences in post-separation parenting time for the
courts to invoke the presumption. Something in the order of a 65 - 35 split in
parenting time may suffice to trigger section 69(4) over section 69(5). However,
the courts have also been careful to point out that presumptions do not create bars
to decisions that would otherwise be in the best interests of the child. The overarch-
ing concern is always the child’s best interests and any presumption one way or the
other will merely be treated as an additional factor to consider. This interpretation
of the new burden of proof provisions does not offer the clarity that many perhaps
expected of the reform. It also raises questions as to whether the application of
sections 69(4) or (5) will be significant in the overall analysis. For some judges it
likely will and for others it will not, and for some families it will and for others it
will not. As in previous relocation decisions, determinations remain subject to quite
133 Ibid. at para. 42.
134 Ibid. at para. 79.
135 Ibid. at para. 45.
136 2013 BCSC 1415, 2013 CarswellBC 2354, [2013] B.C.J. No. 1714 (B.C. S.C.)
[A.(M.K.)].
137 B.(C.M.), above note 98 at para. 142, citing A.(M.K.), above note 136.
138 2013 BCSC 1863, 2013 CarswellBC 3080, [2013] B.C.J. No. 2242 (B.C. S.C.)
[M.(H.D.)].
139 B.(C.M.), above note 98 at para. 143, citing M.(H.D.), above note 138.
140 B.(C.M.), above note 98 at para. 145.
BRITISH COLUMBIA’S NEW FAMILY LAW   337
broad judicial discretion, albeit some patterns can be used to predict outcomes, no-
tably patterns of care prior to the decision.141 Even the legal procedures the fami-
lies pursue or have pursued (e.g. chambers application vs. trial) could influence
judicial decisions.
(iii) Good Faith
One of the key factors in any relocation analysis is whether the relocation is
being proposed by a parent in good faith. A determination that it is not will weigh
strongly against the court being willing to allow the relocation application, al-
though the best interests of the child will be the overriding factor.142 Section 69(6)
provides the factors that courts must consider when conducting a “good faith” anal-
ysis, including: the reasons given for the relocation, whether the relocation is likely
to enhance the child’s the general quality of life of the child and, if applicable, the
relocating guardian (including increasing emotional well-being or financial or edu-
cational opportunities), whether adequate notice was given by relocating party, and
any pre-existing restrictions on relocation in a prior agreement or order.143
In R.(L.J.), the court noted that section 69 “does not preclude applications [for
relocation] where notice is not given or where best efforts to cooperate with each
other have not been undertaken between the parties, but the failure to satisfy these
requirements is part of the good faith analysis required in s. 69(4).”144 The court
also noted that “good faith is a subjectively held state of mind”, but that “to the
extent a factor listed in s. 69(6) is objective, a positive or negative finding suggests
an inference that the relocating guardian either possessed or did not possess the
required subjective good faith.”145 In R.(L.J.), the mother gave notice. Her reasons
for moving were indicative of subjective good faith in that they were an attempt to
improve economic security and her employment situation. However, she did not
141 DA Rollie Thompson, “Movin’ On: Parental Relocation in Canada” (2004) 42:3 Fam
Ct Rev 398; Thompson, “New Mobility”, above note 75. In the latter article, Thomp-
son reviewed case law from 2009–2011, just prior to the FLA, above note 1, and pre-
dicted that the new burdens of proof in the FLA would change few outcomes. Thomp-
son’s research shows that “well-behaved” primary caregivers generally are permitted to
relocate, whereas shared care cases result mostly in relocation denials. These patterns
mirror the effects of the burdens of proof in the FLA.
142 Hadjioannou, above note 128.
143 FLA, above note 1, s. 69(6).
144 R.(L.J.), above note 78 at para. 63. See also G.(S.), above note 104 at para. 35: verbal
notice in late 2012 was deemed sufficient to weigh in favour of good faith since the
father was not prejudiced by the lack of written notice.
145 R.(L.J.), above note 78 at para. 71. See also S.(S.L.), above note 82 at para. 28 where
the BC Supreme Court notes that “some elements of the Act’s test are unquestionably
objective.” This is seemingly slightly at odds with the BC Provincial Court ruling in
G.(S.), above note 104, where the Court found the mother’s application for relocation
was made in good faith despite the fact that the court also found it was not likely to
improve the child’s quality of life, or in the best interests of the child who had special
needs. The fact that the mother’s primary motivation to relocate was to obtain assis-
tance for her child was good enough for a good faith finding, even though the court
disagreed in the end that the move was in the child’s best interests.
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objectively prove that the relocation was likely to improve her situation, and she
had already relocated, in violation of an interim order. Taken together, the court
found she had not acted in good faith, noting that it would be unfair to encourage
parties to relocate and gain an advantage by having the court consider the disrup-
tion to the child of moving back.146 The court also highlighted that even where a
relocation is not found to be in good faith, it still must consider the section 37(2)
factors and determine if it is in the child’s best interests that the relocation be al-
lowed. In that case, the child had been moved from British Columbia to Tennessee.
The resulting distance from important family members and key relationships, as
well as the lack of clear economic or emotional enhancement, was enough to deny
the relocation.
In Hadjioannou, the father sought to block the mother from relocating to Al-
berta with their three children. Neither party was co-parenting in a cooperative
manner following their separation. The mother admitted to being broke, hurt and
depressed, and wanted to get away from the father and court proceedings. She
moved away147 (leaving the children with the father pending the hearing) as a
means of doing so, following her new husband who had family in Alberta and who
had moved there to take a job. The court found that the mother showed a lack of
judgment in thinking that moving away from the father would meet the needs of the
children.148 The evidence showed that she had made little effort to make her finan-
cial situation work where she was. Specifically she had made no effort to apply for
jobs prior to relocating. In denying the relocation, the BC Supreme Court held that
the relocation was in bad faith and that moving the children away from their father
was adverse to the children’s best interests.149 This case indicates that courts may
not be sympathetic to parents who relocate with the children because of depression
or to avoid court proceedings, particularly where such action would rob the chil-
dren of another significant figure in their lives. Perhaps the ruling would have been
different had the mother been diagnosed with clinical depression and her lawyers
could show that leaving the area would benefit her and, by extension, her children.
Under the good faith factor, it appears the courts will also require relocating
parents to consider the impact of the move on the child’s emotional well-being,
which is often closely linked to the maintenance of significant relationships in the
child’s life. In D.(A.J.),150 discussed earlier, the mother sought to move to Atlantic
Canada to pursue economic opportunities and her relationship with her new part-
ner. She attempted to frame the move as adventure for the child and an opportunity
to be exposed to new culture. The court found that the mother’s actions were not in
good faith because she failed to consider the impact of her decision to move the
146 R.(L.J.), above note 78 at para. 73.
147 Hadjioannou, above note 128 at para. 68. The court distinguished the case from
R.(L.J.), above note 78, on one basis, that in R.(L.J.), the mother had relocated with the
child by the time the application could be heard, which it deemed “a much more seri-
ous matter to address.”
148 Ibid. at para. 51.
149 Ibid. at paras. 54, 57, 90.
150 D.(A.J.), above note 86 at para. 45.
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child on the child’s relationship with the father and the grandparents, who were
significant figures in the child’s life.
Good faith has, however, been found by the courts in some cases. In C.(T.),
discussed above, the mother wanted to move from Port Coquitlam to Bellingham,
Washington with her six year old child. Her primary reasons for the move were to
be with her new husband and to take advantage of what she perceived to be better
economic opportunities. The court found that these were acceptable motives and
that the mother was being reasonable in her belief that the move would be better for
her and her child.151 In allowing the relocation, the Court placed great weight on
the new location not being too far away and the mother’s offer to drive the child to
the Canadian side of the border. The court found it was comparable to moving to
Surrey and that it caused no significant impediment in time or distance to the father
that would undermine his attempts to preserve a relationship with his son.152
In M. (M.) v. J. (C.),153 the father applied to move an eight year old child from
Maple Ridge (near Vancouver) to an area just outside Calgary. The parties had
separated when the child was four. A prior joint custody agreement prohibited relo-
cation with the child from the Lower Mainland without approval of the other guard-
ian, and the parties had had substantially equal parenting time since separation. The
mother did not like the father’s new partner, with whom the child had bonded. The
father argued that the move would allow him to pursue his dream job with the
RCMP. The court found that this set of facts was sufficient to constitute good faith,
despite the fact that the father had demonstrated a pattern of unilaterally making
changes to prior agreements between the parties. The significance of the promotion
and the excellence of the opportunity were cited as primary reasons, noting the
lifestyle benefits for the child.154 The relocation restriction in the separation agree-
ment that the father had disregarded was stated as a factor to consider, but not
determinative, since it is the best interests of the child that are the primary consider-
ation.155 Great emphasis was placed on the fact that both parties from the marriage
had remarried and had new children, and the father’s opportunity for career ad-
vancement.156 The child had also expressed a preference to live with the father.157
As noted above, the Supreme Court recently provided greater clarity on good
faith analysis in B.(C.M.) Justice Fleming “concluded that the correct approach
under s. 69(4) and s. 69(5) is for the court to consider whether the proposed reloca-
tion is made in good faith and whether reasonable and workable arrangements have
been proposed. If one or both of these criteria are not met, the court must still go on
to consider whether the proposed relocation is in the child’s best interests. Satisfac-
tion of good faith and reasonable workable arrangements is necessary in order for a
151 C.(T.), above note 107 at paras. 76, 84.
152 Ibid. at para. 89.
153 M.(M.), above note 124.
154 Ibid. at paras. 61, 62.
155 Ibid. at para. 65.
156 Ibid. at para. 66.
157 Ibid. at para. 75.
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relocating guardian to benefit from the presumption under s. 69(4)(b) that the move
is in the best interests of the child.”158
Showing a superior economic opportunity from an objective perspective
seems to go a long way toward establishing good faith, as it did in much previous
jurisprudence. This factor can be persuasive even where a prior separation agree-
ment indicates roughly equal parenting time and a hurdle to the success of an appli-
cation to relocate. Economic advantages are presumed to be in the best interests of
the child, particularly where the child expresses a preference to live with the relo-
cating parent. Parents can, it seems, disregard separation agreements and still be
found to be in good faith when the right set of conditions adheres.
The primary factors that courts have considered to date are the preservation of
stability, particularly within a community and at school, and the important relation-
ships in the child’s life (often, but not limited to, the other guardian and their rela-
tives),159 educational and cultural opportunities for the child,160 and prospects for
economic improvement on the part of the relocating parent.161 In cases where the
children have special needs, access to and a guardian’s willingness to work with
professionals responsible for the child’s care is a paramount consideration. In such
cases, the importance of preserving close relationships with the child is also magni-
fied.162 The views of the child, as long as the child is eight or older, have also
carried weight with the courts.163
4. FAMILY VIOLENCE
The introduction of the FLA is particularly significant when it comes to the
definition and application of family violence, which must be taken into account in
making parenting determinations. Unlike the Family Relations Act, which did not
mention family violence, the FLA both defines family violence and tries to make it
a central consideration in determinations of parenting arrangements that are in the
best interests of a child. Family violence is defined as including attempted and ac-
tual physical or sexual abuse, as well as psychological and emotional abuse. Physi-
cal abuse is broadly defined in section 1 to include “forced confinement or depriva-
tion of the necessities of life, but not including the reasonable use of force to
protect oneself or others from harm.”164 It also includes “sexual abuse of a family
member” and attempts to physically or sexually abuse a family member. Psycho-
logical or emotional abuse is defined to include the following: “intimidation, har-
assment, coercion or threats, including threats to person, pets or property; unrea-
sonable restrictions on, or prevention of, a family member’s financial or personal
158 B.(C.M.), above note 98 at para. 78.
159 P.(L.J.), above note 67.
160 S.(S.L.), above note 82 at paras. 39-40.
161 See Hansen, above note 114; M.(M.), above note 124; De Jong, above note 101;
R.(L.J.), above note 78.
162 G.(S.), above note 104; C. (K.A.) v. M. (R.J.), 2013 BCSC 1103, 2013 CarswellBC
1894, [2013] B.C.J. No. 1348 (B.C. S.C.).
163 M.(M.), above note 124 at para. 79. See also FLA, above note 1, s. 37(2)(b).
164 FLA, above note 1, s. 1.
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autonomy; stalking or following the family member; and intentional damage to
family property.”
As concerns children, family violence includes either direct or indirect expo-
sure of the child to family violence.165 Section 37 of the FLA specifies that an
agreement or order will not be in the best interests of a child “unless it protects, to
the greatest extent possible, the child’s physical, psychological and emotional
safety, security and well-being.” The section also requires that the impact of any
family violence on the child’s safety, security or well-being be considered, no mat-
ter whether the family violence is directed toward the child or another family mem-
ber. Courts must also consider whether the actions of the person responsible for the
violence indicate that their capacity to care for the child and meet the child’s needs
may be impaired.166
The FLA leaves ample room for latitude by the courts in the determination of
what constitutes family violence. An expansive discussion of what constitutes fam-
ily violence occurred in B. (M.W.) v. B. (A.R.), which involved a dispute over who
should have primary residence. The mother and father had two children, the young-
est of which was twelve. The mother had been the primary caregiver for three years
since the divorce. In that time, the mother repeatedly interfered with the father’s
access to and communication with his children, and refused to settle orders that
were correctly drawn up by lawyers, thus prolonging litigation and intensifying the
conflict. The children had been exposed to escalating conflict throughout the pro-
ceedings. The court found that the combination of the mother’s conduct in ob-
structing the sale of the commercial property, restricting the father’s access to his
children, frivolous escalation of the litigation, and actions in respect of parenting
arrangements were emotionally abusive and constituted family violence.167 The fa-
ther was given primary residence. This case demonstrated how several factors
taken together can constitute family violence, even where each factor taken alone
may not do so.
The inclusion of psychological and emotional abuse will be of particular inter-
est as the number of potential acts that could constitute family violence has been
clarified and, arguably, expanded. Section 38 states that “the court must consider
whether any psychological abuse constitutes, or is evidence of, a pattern of coer-
cive and controlling behaviour directed at a family member”,168 codifying a char-
acterization of controlling behaviour as a form of abuse. The BC Provincial Court
has cited B. (M.W.) v. B. (A.R.)169 for the proposition that “what is or is not family
violence must be interpreted from a liberal and expansive view and can include
many forms of behaviour.”170 It is therefore relevant to examine how the courts
have applied this expanded definition thus far, including the influence of culture on
165 Ibid.
166 Ibid., s. 37(2)(g), s. 37(2)(h); see also J.(C.A.), above note 16 at para. 100.
167 B. (M.W.) v. B. (A.R.), 2013 BCSC 885, 2013 CarswellBC 1466, [2013] B.C.J. No.
1041 (B.C. S.C.) at paras. 199-200 [B.(M.W.)].
168 FLA, above note 1, s. 38(d).
169 B.(M.W.), above note 167.
170 R. (N.C.) v. C. (K.D.), 2014 BCPC 9, 2014 CarswellBC 361, [2014] B.C.J. No. 273
(B.C. Prov. Ct.) at para. 113.
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the analysis, as well as the effect this interpretation has had on parenting
arrangements.
In an interesting application, a failure to pay child support in conjunction with
inappropriate behaviour was found to constitute family violence. In P. (J.C.) v. B.
(J.),171 the daughter was living with the mother and her family in Surrey. The fa-
ther had access. The evidence was conflicting, with both parties claiming assault by
the other. The mother claimed that the child was conceived by sexual assault and
that the father inappropriately touched the child. It was established that the father
used a secret camera to record a parenting time exchange and then submitted that
evidence in court. He also used the child to try to get the mother to agree to certain
things and failed to pay child support on time and in full. The mother applied for a
finding of family violence and a parenting order.
The Provincial Court found that the conflicting evidence regarding the assaults
amounted to a “he said she said” scenario, so assault was not established on a bal-
ance of probabilities.172 However, the father’s failure to pay child support on time
and in full, combined with his other actions and words did constitute family vio-
lence: his failure to pay was a calculated and deliberate act designed to inflict psy-
chological and emotional harm and control the mother’s behaviour. Judge Merrick
was satisfied that the father’s goal was to inflict emotional harm and destabilize the
mother’s parenting.173 He also found that this impacted the child’s well being, and
that the father’s ability to care for the child was impaired. He exhibited a lack of
commitment to the child, an unwillingness to work with the mother, and a pattern
of putting his own interests ahead of the child.174 This case demonstrated a judge
considering a guardian’s actions in context and in combination when determining
what constitutes psychological abuse.
Another example of this contextual analysis is found in R. (L.A.) v. R. (E.J.)175
On the evidence, there were two serious incidents of violent conduct by the father
during the marriage. The children were not exposed to this violence but during both
the marriage and the post separation period, the father directed comments towards
the mother in the presence of the children that were deemed to amount to “actual
‘emotional abuse’”.176 Justice Schultes found that “in general [the father] has not
taken the care that a responsible parent should do to avoid speaking disparagingly
of a former spouse and her new partner, and to avoid involving children in topics
that are beyond their maturity to cope with.”177 Combined with the physical assault
that the father perpetrated on the mother’s new boyfriend, the judge was “con-
cerned about what else he might be capable of if further conflict with [the
mother]or [her boyfriend] leads him to deem it justified.”178 The children were
171 2013 BCPC 297, 2013 CarswellBC 3253, [2013] B.C.J. No. 2048 (B.C. Prov. Ct.).
172 Ibid. at para. 12.
173 Ibid. at para. 15.
174 Ibid. at paras. 19–24.
175 2014 BCSC 966, 2014 CarswellBC 1511, [2014] B.C.J. No. 1072 (B.C. S.C.).
176 Ibid. at para. 149.
177 Ibid.
178 Ibid. at para. 150.
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required to live with their mother, and professional supervision of the father’s
parenting time was ordered until “he [demonstrated] a track record of mature
parenting that [made] it safe for the children to dispense with it.”179
This decision demonstrates an understanding of the potentially damaging ef-
fects on children of exposing them to abusive verbal communication between their
parents. Also, the acknowledgement that evidence of violent altercations warranted
a concern regarding what else could occur, showed insight into the importance of
the court having an eye to limiting children’s exposure to future violence. In ser-
vice of that objective, a graduated parenting arrangement predicated on improve-
ments in an abusive parent’s behaviour, represents a comprehensive effort to pro-
tect children from the deleterious effects of family conflict and provides a useful
example going forward.
Also of interest is the manner in which courts have assessed violence that
seems ambiguous in origin, where it is difficult to tell who initiates the violence. In
B.(C.M.), there was evidence of violent behaviour by both parties.180 The case was
on appeal from Provincial Court, where the trial judge had found that the violence
had not been perpetrated against the mother “for no reason”.181 This finding was an
essential factor in the trial judge’s decision that the father’s behaviour did not con-
stitute family violence. The BC Supreme Court called this a “troubling conclusion”,
stating that “it is not for Ms. B to prove she was the innocent victim of violence,
nor is the “consensual” nature of violence at all meaningful when determining the
best interests of the children.”182 The failure to consider the impact of the violence
on the children in accordance with sections 37 and 38 of the FLA constituted an
error of law. In allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court explicitly cited the combi-
nation of the trial judge’s approach to family violence, her failure to consider
mandatory factors regarding family violence as well as some section 37(2) factors,
and her misapprehension of important evidence relevant to the best interests of the
child as the primary reasons for this decision.183 The order of the Provincial Court
was set aside and the matter was “remitted to the Provincial Court for a new trial on
all issues.”184
The statement in B.(C.M.) that the party alleging family violence does not
have to prove that they are an innocent victim, demonstrates an important aware-
ness that victims of violence, particularly children, may still experience harm even
where they have participated in the violence to some degree themselves. Going
forward, this interpretation should help to undermine and discourage the use of the
argument that one party “provoked” the violence, in order to justify it. This argu-
ment is often put forward by abusers to justify their actions so it is encouraging to
see the Court effectively block its use. However, the manner in which the courts
will draw lines between those initiating violence and those using self-defence re-
mains to be seen. The boundaries of what constitutes the initiation of violence also
179 Ibid. at para. 151.
180 B.(C.M.), above note 98 at para. 125.
181 Ibid. at para. 126.
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid. at para. 150.
184 Ibid. at para. 153.
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need to be defined. If a verbal statement leads to an overt physical confrontation,
will the statement itself be considered violence in addition to the altercation? It is
also noteworthy that the court in B.(C.M.) separates the discussion of who caused
the violence from its impact on the children. Justice Fleming highlights that “con-
sensual” violence between spouses may be harmful to children, regardless of who
initiated it.185 This approach demonstrates the court placing the focus on determin-
ing what arrangement is in the best interests of the children and will minimize the
damage and likelihood of reoccurrence of violence, as opposed to assigning blame
to either party.
Given the broad interpretation of the family violence provisions in the early
jurisprudence, it is important to consider what acts the courts have found do not
constitute family violence. In British Columbia (Director of Child, Family and
Community Service) v. M. (A.),186 both the mother and the father were drug users.
The mother’s parents were also drug addicts and had frequently been incarcerated
for stealing and drug possession. The mother and her parents had been living with
the children. Child protection concerns had been present since 2011. The child’s
grandparents had caused the mother and the child to be evicted and had exposed the
child to drug paraphernalia and drugs. The father took over care of the children
after this occurred, and had facilitated access with the mother. However, the father
admitted to smoking marijuana after the kids were asleep.187 The Court found that
the father’s marijuana use and the presence of drugs in the same home as the chil-
dren did not constitute family violence. The father was deemed to have shown ma-
turity in removing the child from the mother’s care because of her inability to live
separately from her drug addicted parents, while at the same time treating her re-
spectfully and facilitating her access to the children. These acts were taken as an
indication the father could look after the child’s best interests.188
In H.(S.T.), both parents had a history of drug use, and one of the children was
born drug addicted as a result. Both parents had taken active steps to get clean, and
had been for a year or so. The relationship between the mother and father was,
however, explosive at times. The mother had dated violent men since the separa-
tion, a factor that had ultimately forced the removal of the child. The mother had
also inappropriately spanked the other child due to an inability to deal with that
child’s behavioural challenges. The court found that “neither parent [was] impaired
in their ability to care for the children or meet their needs due to family vio-
lence.”189 The inappropriate spanking was not a factor because the mother had
learned from her mistake and she had also made a clean break from her previous
violent relationship. The parents’ drug use was not a factor and the potential for
poor judgment in the future could be mitigated with counselling and professional
help.190
185 Ibid. at paras. 125-126. The term “consensual” was used by the trial judge and placed
in quotation marks by the appellate court.
186 2013 BCPC 134, 2013 CarswellBC 1696, [2013] B.C.J. No. 1194 (B.C. Prov. Ct.).
187 Ibid. at para. 65.
188 Ibid. at para. 66.
189 H.(S.T.), above note 7 at para. 139.
190 Ibid. at para. 138.
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These cases appear to stand for the principle that exposing the children to drug
use does not necessarily constitute family violence under the FLA. They also ap-
pear to support the idea that it is important to preserve children’s relationships with
their guardians even when those guardians have repeatedly shown an inability or
unwillingness to protect the child from harmful activities. Both mothers had ex-
posed the children to drugs and to criminal behaviour multiple times, showing a
lack of judgment and an inability to put the children’s interests first. There was
substantial risk that the parents would begin using drugs in a way that compromised
their capacity for parenting. Researchers have found a “strong association between
the severity of childhood trauma and parental alcohol and drug abuse.”191 Recent
studies suggest that parental substance abuse can undermine the stability of a
child’s environment, making children’s needs secondary to the parents’ drug addic-
tion, which can lead to various levels of neglect, maltreatment and abuse,192 as well
as increased risk of the child using drugs in the future.193 Despite this research,
there was no discussion by the court of the potential psychological harm done to
children by their parents’ drug use. In these cases, the court appeared to believe that
a continued relationship with parents in this fragile state was more in the children’s
interests than removing them from their parent’s lives until they had cleaned up and
stabilized their own lives.
Indeed, some research suggests that the court’s approach may be viable and
preferable for mothers and children, provided proper supports are available.194 The
debate in the research highlights the difficulty in determining whether child expo-
sure to parental drug use should qualify as family violence. There is little doubt that
such exposure can have harmful effects on children, if parents’ drug use is not
adequately addressed through seeking treatment and additional parenting support
where necessary. Minimizing the harmful effects of child exposure to drug use
should be an important goal when determining parenting arrangements.
Also of note in the recent case law is that solitary or infrequent acts of vio-
lence have not been considered “family violence” by the courts. Section 38 of the
FLA directs decision-makers to consider factors such as the frequency of the family
violence and the nature and seriousness of it. In P. (C.) v. C. (B.),195 an incident of
violence occurred following separation. The father was very intoxicated and called
the mother derogatory names, forced his way inside the house, accused her of hav-
ing another man, grabbed her face, and pushed her against the counter. The court
found that the act of violence was a singular one and that there was no evidence
that it indicated impairment in the father’s ability to care for the child and meet his
191 Chris Taplin et al, “Family History of Alcohol and Drug Abuse, Childhood Trauma,
and Age of First Drug Injection” (2014) 49:10 Substance Use and Misuse 1311 at
1314.
192 Marina Barnard & Neil McKeganey, “The Impact of Parental Drug Use on Children:
What is the Problem and What Can Be Done to Help?” (2004) 99:5 Addiction 552 at
553.
193 Ibid. at 555.
194 Susan C Boyd, From Witches to Crack Moms: Women, Drug Law, and Policy (Dur-
ham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2004) at 128–131.
195 2013 BCPC 112, 2013 CarswellBC 1339, [2013] B.C.J. No. 3033 (B.C. Prov. Ct.).
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needs.196 However, the court did limit the father’s parenting time, ordering that it
proceed slowly and consistently, in accordance with the child’s wishes. The court
stated that section 37 of the FLA “provides a general direction to ‘ensure the great-
est possible protection of a child’s physical, psychological and emotional
safety’.”197 The fact that the child expressed severe anxiety in his father’s new
home indicated that the court should take such measures. The order was for the
father to have parenting time one day a week and alternating Sundays, with unlim-
ited telephone contact as desired.
In Van Kooten v. More,198 there was evidence of repeated heated arguments
during the parents’ relationship. While each parent loved the child, the child was
caught between them in their battle, and was left conflicted and anxious due to the
tension between the parents.199 The father had verbally violent episodes which, the
evidence indicated, occurred only twice. The court found that these incidents did
not place the child at risk.200 Apparently, the child’s anxiety regarding his father,
stemming from the repeated arguments between the parents, was not sufficient to
constitute family violence. In and of itself, family conflict resulting in periodic ver-
bally abusive behaviour was not considered to be family violence of the kind that
endangered the child, even though the child had expressed anxiety and emotional
turmoil stemming from the conflict.
It is also important to note that despite the new and enlightened approach to
family violence, judges have been reluctant to terminate guardianship rights, even
when they find that violence has occurred. Termination seems to be a last resort
measure. In D. (C.E.) v. L. (C.L.),201 the court noted that the key question is
whether the risks of family violence are manageable by the victimized party with
the assistance of a court order in a way that will protect the safety, security and well
being of the child.202 The court found that despite an “unfortunate history of high
conflict and a theme of domestic violence in the relationship between the Mother
and the Father, that that had not necessarily impaired the ability of either to care for
the Child and to meet the Child’s needs.”203 This ruling was made despite the fact
that the mother was working in the sex trade and had shown a pattern of being
involved in abusive relationships since the separation, and the father had shown a
tendency of violence towards and manipulation of the mother.204
In R. (N.C.) v. C. (K.D.),205 the court found that the father had physically
abused and/or attempted to physically abuse the mother on some occasions. In ad-
dition there was emotional and psychological abuse in the form of intimidation and
196 Ibid. at paras. 104, 106.
197 Ibid. at para. 108.
198 2013 BCSC 1076, 2013 CarswellBC 1829, [2013] B.C.J. No. 1305 (B.C. S.C.).
199 Ibid. at para. 33.
200 Ibid. at para. 34.
201 2014 BCPC 34, 2014 CarswellBC 694, [2014] B.C.J. No. 812 (B.C. Prov. Ct.).
202 Ibid. at para. 93.
203 Ibid. at para. 94.
204 Ibid. at para. 89.
205 2014 BCPC 9, 2014 CarswellBC 361, [2014] B.C.J. No. 273 (B.C. Prov. Ct.).
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threats against her and her property, unreasonable restrictions on her personal au-
tonomy, and intentional damage to her property. The child was also exposed to the
violence, both directly and indirectly.206 The court nevertheless declined to either
terminate guardianship or issue a Protection Order, being “confident any further
behaviours on his part which could amount to family violence will no longer oc-
cur.”207 This conclusion was drawn despite the fact that the father had not made
any efforts to address his anger and control issues.208 The court felt more comforta-
ble giving him the opportunity to do so and to attend family dispute resolution to
schedule parenting time. This decision reveals an optimistic approach to abusive
behaviour that is sometimes taken too lightly and that can create risks in some
situations.
The belief in maximum contact as being beneficial for child development
seems to be playing a role, even though it is not mentioned in the FLA definition of
best interests of the child. One of the assumptions underpinning the B.(M.W.) deci-
sion discussed earlier appeared to be that a connection with their father was the
most important factor in serving the children’s best interests. Mr. Justice N. Brown
also felt that the father was better able to facilitate contact with the mother, and that
the inverse would be unlikely to occur,209 showing that the analysis of family vio-
lence can be influenced if it is conducted through the prism of the maximum con-
tact/friendly parent principle found in the Divorce Act,210 but not the FLA.
In L. (D.N.) v. S. (C.N.),211 the mother had had primary care of her eleven year
old daughter for several years and at the time of divorce. The child had been in the
middle of conflict since she was born. She had strong ties to her mother and, while
she loved her father, she experienced anxiety and emotional distress in his com-
pany. The father repeatedly discussed the litigation with his daughter, and refer-
enced the mother negatively, saying that she was in therapy and implying that she
was responsible for the parties’ failure to communicate with each other.212 He also
made derogatory remarks toward the daughter regarding her weight and appear-
ance. The court found that when angry, the father had made ill-considered com-
ments toward the child and that these comments amounted to psychological
abuse.213 Nevertheless, while this behaviour was determined to be family violence,
it was found that the father did not “intend” to harm the child, and he was able to
exercise parenting responsibly when he applied himself. Mr. Justice Pearlman then
referred to the maximum contact principle as indicating that the child should have
as much parenting time with each parent as possible, as long as it protected her
206 Ibid. at para. 116.
207 Ibid. at para. 118.
208 Ibid. at paras. 116, 128.
209 B.(M.W.), above note 167 at para. 210.
210 DA, above note 71, s. 16(10).
211 2013 BCSC 809, 2013 CarswellBC 1212, [2013] B.C.J. No. 954 (B.C. S.C.) [L.(D.N.)].
212 Ibid. at paras. 34–37.
213 Ibid. at para. 58.
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emotional safety, security and well being.214 This often criticized principle215 was
cited as justification for the position that it was in the best interests of the child’s
emotional and psychological well being that she develop a stable relationship with
her father. However, it was acknowledged that the father’s inconsistent and insensi-
tive behaviour toward her would make this difficult. Despite the child’s expressed
preference not to spend overnights with her father, the court continued one over-
night every two weeks on the basis that overnights were required to develop a sta-
ble relationship with him.216
This case appears to be an example of the invocation of the maximum contact
principle in a manner that does not fully acknowledge the harm of psychological
abuse. Parents who commit psychological abuse can be permitted continued and
substantial access to their children, provided they have shown they can be capable
parents on some level. Emphasizing maximum contact more heavily than the well-
being of children is potentially problematic from a child development perspective
and has caused significant problems in jurisdictions such as Australia.217
Another example arises in R. (B.T.) v. A. (U.),218 where there was evidence of
both parents perpetrating violence against their two daughters, A and T. A was 15
years old and T was 9 years old at the time of trial. The Supreme Court found on
the evidence that both parents had engaged in physical acts against one or the other
child.219 These incidents included the father hitting T in a restaurant, to the point
where a patron called the Ministry of Children, and the mother engaging in a vio-
lent hair pulling altercation with the A. There was also evidence of both parties
inflicting emotional abuse on the children, particularly during the litigation.
Justice Masuhara held that “neither has the higher ground in terms of parent-
ing child T. Neither is a perfect parent. The acrimony in this dispute has amplified
the negative characterization of the parties . . .. Recognizing that with some finality
in the litigation, the tensions between the parties usually moderate; the best inter-
ests of child T would be served by an equal parenting regime where the child is
parented on an alternating weekly basis.”220 Both parties retained guardianship of
T. The father was granted primary residence and decision making power regarding
A, while T was to spend equal time in both residences with the mother having final
decision making authority.221 The judge also advised the parents to seek guidance
on how to parent without physical violence.222 Separating the children from each
other and keeping them with the parent with whom they had a better relationship,
214 Ibid. at para. 60.
215 Jonathan Cohen & Nikki Gershbain, “For the Sake of the Fathers? Child Custody Re-
form and the Perils of Maximum Contact” (2001) 19 Can. Fam. L.Q. 121.
216 L.(D.N.), above note 211 at para. 63.
217 Rhoades, “Legislating to Promote Children’s Welfare”, above note 31.
218 2014 BCSC 1012, 2014 CarswellBC 1595, [2014] B.C.J. No. 1127 (B.C. S.C.).
219 Ibid. at para. 90.
220 Ibid. at para. 99.
221 Ibid. at para. 103.
222 Ibid. at para. 97.
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while advising the parents to seek treatment for their violent behaviours, was seen
as preferable to temporary removal or placing the children with relatives.
In F. (N.A.) v. M. (C.D.),223 the father applied for interim joint custody and
guardianship of their two children, pending a final determination on the issue of
custody. The mother had moved the children from Squamish to Kelowna without
providing notice to the father. She justified her unilateral decision by arguing that
the father had history of abusive behaviour. Under a section of the judgment titled
“Maximizing Contact”, Master Scarth noted that while the mother had been pri-
mary caregiver, “[t]he evidence is that the children have a good relationship with
both parents”, and the father “had a significant role in the children’s lives.”224
In its analysis of the alleged family violence, the court found that “[t]he differ-
ences in the parties’ evidence as to the incidents of violence cannot be resolved on
this application. The question is the extent to which the undisputed incidents are
relevant to [the father’s] ability to parent the children, or support a conclusion that
it would not be in the children’s best interests to be in [the father’s] care.”225 Be-
cause of the mother’s suggestion that she feared for her own safety but not the
children’s,226 and because some of the evidentiary conflicts could not be resolved
on this application, the court concluded that the move was driven by the mother’s
“own agenda” and that “she did not take into account the disruption to the chil-
dren”227 of the loss of access to their father. Master Scarth granted interim joint
custody and guardianship and ordered the children moved back to Squamish.
This case raises interesting issues concerning the court’s approach when faced
with conflicting evidence on interim applications, and with regard to the mother’s
right to her own safety. There will doubtless be many instances in which courts are
faced with conflicting evidence regarding abusive behaviour, and are forced to
make quick decisions in terms of living arrangements for the children. This case
indicates that courts will sometimes be willing to effectively “punt” the issue, pre-
ferring to wait until trial to resolve the evidence before making major changes to
parenting arrangements. While perhaps prudent from a legal perspective, this ap-
proach is not necessarily practical or desirable from the standpoint of families who
are facing potentially dangerous situations. The fact that the children were not
found to be in direct danger of exposure to abuse from the father is noteworthy.
However, this situation was assumed on the basis of conflicting evidence, which
may have been incomplete at the least. To err on the side of the alleged abusive
party in these instances runs the risk of exposing vulnerable parties to dangerous
circumstances while awaiting the conclusions at trial.
Leaving aside the evidentiary conflict, there was still uncontested evidence of
a physically violent incident towards the mother. Master Scarth made note of the
fact that the violence “could have been addressed by an order limiting contact be-
tween [the parties], and an order for exclusive occupancy of the family home.”228
223 2013 BCSC 2294, 2013 CarswellBC 3904, [2013] B.C.J. No. 2835 (B.C. S.C.).
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Yet that order was not made here. Joint guardianship was ordered until the Judicial
Case Conference the following week, where parenting terms were to be
discussed.229
The assumption flowing from the order is that even uncontested evidence of
an episode of violence towards a spouse does not necessarily inhibit a parent’s ca-
pacity to parent. The early jurisprudence indicates that occasional acts of violence
towards a spouse will usually not be enough for courts to consider limiting a child’s
exposure to the violent parent, unless the child is a target of that violence. The
emphasis on maximum contact and its perceived benefits to child development
seems to be alive and well, even where the possibility exists for children to be
indirectly exposed to violence between their parents.
That said, it should be noted that where evidence of violence is consistent and
overwhelming, the courts have acted to protect the child, provided independent evi-
dence corroborates a potential guardian’s risk to a child. In M. (L.J.S.) v. S.
(L.T.),230 the mother and father had a toxic relationship, during which family vio-
lence repeatedly took place in the presence of the children. The daughter stated she
did not want to stay overnight with the father. The mother alleged that the daughter
had told her that her father sexually abused her. Medical opinion admitted at court
corroborated that the father was a sexual abuse risk towards girls. The father’s ac-
cess to his daughter was limited to daytime access only at the request of the daugh-
ter, and on neutral territory such as a restaurant. The father was also barred from
contacting his daughter via telephone.
Cultural considerations have also influenced judicial determination of what
constitutes family violence. In G. (B.K.) v. G. (H.S.),231 the family involved was
Sikh and both parents were born in India. The marriage had been arranged. They
met for the first time just a few days before the wedding. The relationship was
short-lived and post separation, the child had gone with the mother to live in Sur-
rey, British Columbia while the father remained in Calgary. The child, now five
years old, was perceived by the court to be happy and healthy living with the
mother. The mother alleged family violence on the part of the father, specifically
that he would occasionally hit her and the child, that the father sexually abused her,
and undermined her financial autonomy. The parents had resided together for only
a few months.
Mr. Justice Verhoeven stated that the mother’s “evidence has to be ap-
proached with a great deal of caution” as it was “likely exaggerated.”232 He also
noted that while the allegations regarding the husband’s behaviour and influence on
her financial autonomy likely contained some truth, it had to be regarded in a cul-
tural context: “I was not surprised to hear that the father was concerned about the
modesty of his wife’s attire. Many things in the relationship were governed by cul-
tural traditions. The marriage itself was arranged of course.”233 Verhoeven J. then
stated: “I think it is likely that [the mother] was simply very unhappy, and wanted
229 Ibid. at para. 52.
230 M.(L.J.S.), above note 71.
231 2013 BCSC 1942, 2013 CarswellBC 3541, [2013] B.C.J. No. 2522 (B.C. S.C.).
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to leave and live somewhere distant from her husband and his family, who she very
clearly does not like.”234 This invocation of “culture” to diminish the mother’s con-
cerns was made despite the fact that the court accepted evidence that the father was
upset his child was female, and had cancelled both the mother and child’s immigra-
tion sponsorship upon learning that the mother had lied about having gotten genetic
testing for the child as requested by him. The father had also failed to provide full
financial disclosure, harassed the mother via phone and made a suicide threat fol-
lowing their separation. Despite this evidence of controlling behaviour, the court
held there was no evidence the father had harmed the child, or that any of his ac-
tions constituted violence or were indicative of serious psychological dysfunc-
tion.235 The mother was awarded sole custody under the Divorce Act, but both par-
ties remained guardians under the FLA. The father had unsupervised but limited
parenting time and if the parents could not agree on significant decisions, the
mother had the right to make them.
When it comes to defining the boundaries for family violence, the decision in
G.(B.K.) carries the implication that practices that are assumed to be “cultural” may
be respected with little interrogation and regardless of whether they are consistent
with equality concerns. Apparently no expert evidence was offered on the cultural
norms. From the perspective of the FLA, it seems that the husband’s actions could
have been found to constitute family violence. The father revoked the child and the
mother’s immigration sponsorship upon learning that the mother had not submitted
to genetic testing. When combined with his other behaviours, these actions qualify
as undermining her financial and personal autonomy as well as being contrary to
the best interests of the child. The court seemed willing to dismiss these acts as
being expected to some degree in Indian culture, and therefore not indicative of
family violence. Following the separation, the husband’s subsequent mental insta-
bility and dishonesty was treated as an isolated incident, rather than as indicative of
a pattern of behaviour.
This case raises the spectre of cultural relativism, and whether some courts
may, in an effort to place cases in their proper context and to respect the practices
of various cultures, undermine the impact of the new FLA norms on family vio-
lence. The G.(B.K.) case is even more troubling when contrasted with cases where
the courts have determined that family violence existed under the FLA. The courts
have expressly noted that the definition of family violence includes psychological
and emotional harm, including intimidation, harassment, coercion, or threats. Dam-
age to property and unreasonable restrictions on a person’s autonomy are also in-
cluded, as is the indirect exposure of a child to violent behaviour.236
5. CONCLUSION
At this early stage, it would be premature to suggest with any degree of au-
thority how interpretation of the FLA provisions on guardianship, relocation, and
family violence will proceed, given the paucity of appellate authority. Nevertheless,
this review of the first year of jurisprudence suggests that the courts are reluctant to
234 Ibid. at para. 38.
235 Ibid. at para. 53.
236 B.(M.W.), above note 167 at para. 194.
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decline guardianship to parents and are more likely to fine-tune the parameters of
parental responsibilities and parenting time in order to deal with concerns about
parenting ability or quality. As for relocation, it appears that the new burden of
proof provisions may not make as much difference as might have been expected,
with judicial discretion under the best interests of the child still playing a key role
and generating some indeterminacy in outcomes. Finally, while the detailed new
provisions on family violence are being interpreted quite broadly, they are not al-
ways applied in a way that offers optimal protection of the safety of children and
their caregivers, and a focus on maximum contact still appears to play a role, de-
spite it not being mentioned in the legislation. 
